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Abstract
We investigate supply-side barriers to medical care in Colombia, where citizens have
a constitutional right to health, but insurance companies impose restrictions. We use
administrative data on judicial claims for health as a proxy for unmet demand. We
validate this using the health services utilization register, showing that judicial claims
map into large, pervasive decreases in medical consultations, procedures, hospitaliza-
tions and emergency care. This manifests in population health outcomes. We identify
increases in mortality pervasive across cause, age and sex, with larger increases for
cancer, individuals over the age of fifty, women and the poor.
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1 Introduction
Universal health coverage has recently garnered widespread support as a policy objective
(Bloom et al., 2018). It is seen as marking the third great transition in public health,
following the demographic and epidemiological transitions of the past two centuries (Rodin
and de Ferranti, 2012). However it is increasingly recognized that there are weak links
between coverage and population health outcomes. Some studies have highlighted low uptake
(Banerjee et al., 2010, 2021), while others have highlighted poor service quality (Mohanan
et al., 2014; Powell-Jackson et al., 2015; Kruk et al., 2018). We instead investigate supply-side
denials or restrictions on access to care. The setting is Colombia where a state commitment
to the right to health for all (Article 48) was written into the new constitution formulated in
1991, following which a new health care system that progressively reached nearly universal
health coverage was put in place. The Constitution provides judicial protection of the right
to health and a series of other human rights (Article 86), allowing citizens who fear that their
rights are jeopardized because of restrictions to file claims for redress with the Constitutional
Court.1 These judicial claims (tutelas) are costless, simple, can be filed with any judge within
the local jurisdiction, and have preferential proceeding such that the judge is mandated to
return a decision within ten days. This is a major ‘experiment’ in accountability.
The right to health is explicitly recognized, to a greater or lesser extent, in the written
constitutions of more than half of all UN member countries (Kinney and Clark, 2004; Back-
man et al., 2008; Hamel et al., 2015). However it is only in some cases that this notional
commitment is accompanied by constitutional provisions to guarantee its enforcement, in-
cluding the possibility of legal recourse. In Colombia, use of tutelas and complaints as an
enforcement mechanism has become widespread, leading to what is referred as judicialization
of health care (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2009, 2010; Parra-Vera and Yamin, 2013). Although
they seem less widespread in these countries, similar provisions exist in Argentina (Bergallo,
2011), Brazil (Biehl et al., 2009), Costa Rica (Monge, 2019) and South Africa (Wilson, 2011).
The commitment to health coverage in Colombia has been delivered, since 1993, through
a managed competition model of health insurance which, at 90 percent, has one of the
highest levels of comprehensive insurance coverage among developing economies. Private
health insurers are responsible for organizing provision of health services, but tight regulation
constrains the extent to which insurers can vary the premium, the content of the benefits
package, or risk-based enrollee selection, the strategic variables that are typically available
to insurers to manipulate. Competition between insurers for enrollees is thus driven by the
1Colombia is one of 63 countries that has an independent constitutional court, a high court that deals pri-
marily with constitutional law. Other countries, including the US, delegate constitutional judicial authority
to their general court system, with the final decision-making power resting in the Supreme Court.
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network of providers and service quality (Miller et al., 2013). In practice, insurers have to
be authorized to operate in a municipality,2 so competition takes place at a subnational
level and local markets tend to be highly concentrated. This, together with the fact that
insurers get a risk-adjusted fixed fee per enrollee that is common across insurers while the
costs they incur depend on a variable demand for medical services, generates an incentive
to impose barriers to restrict access to medical care as a cost-reduction strategy, especially
when the punishments for doing so are small. A weak punishment regime reflects the weak
administrative capacity that characterizes many low and middle income countries (Banerjee
et al., 2021).
The evidence is accumulating to suggest that health insurers have been systematically
restricting access of enrollees to required medical services, mostly through delays or denials
of prior authorization for examinations, medicines, surgeries or treatments that have already
been prescribed by a health professional (Maya, 2008; Corte Constitucional, 2008; Yamin and
Parra-Vera, 2009, 2010; Parra-Vera and Yamin, 2013; Arrieta-Gómez, 2018).3 In response
to these restrictions, individuals have pursued litigation. Between 2010 and 2016, more
than 675,000 tutelas (judicial claims) were filed against health insurers. On average, 80%
of health-related claims were decided in favor of claimants. We provide what appears to
be the first quantitative analysis of the content of the judicial claims instrument, using
comprehensive administrative data.
We obtained administrative data on all tutelas filed at the municipality-insurer-year level
for 2010-2016, involving an average of 80 health insurers per year operating across 1,120 mu-
nicipalities.4 We merged these data with insurer-specific mortality rates by age, sex and
cause of death, obtained from Vital Statistics registers containing individual-level records
for the entire population. We also obtained, at the municipality-year level, administrative
records that contain the universe of medical services provided, classified by type of diag-
noses (e.g. neoplasms vs mental disorders) and type of service (consultations, procedures,
hospitalization, emergencies).
A key feature of our study is that we use data on judicial claims as a measure of unmet
demand for health care. We define unmet demand as the set of health services requested
(demanded) but not delivered because of supply-side barriers, irrespective of whether they
are part of the mandatory benefit plan or not, but conditional on being prescribed by an
2Municipalities are decentralized subdivisions of which there are 1,120 in the country.
3See also the periodical reports of the Colombian Ombudsman office (Defensoŕıa del Pueblo, 2004, 2007,
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015); and a report by the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud y Proteccion
Social, 2018).
4These data are not publicly available. We obtained data on judicial claims and also on complaints to
the Health Superintendent by filing a petition under the Right to Information Act.
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independent health professional.5 We sketch a conceptual framework that captures the
decision of insurers to deny health claims, and the decision of citizens to litgate when faced
with a denial. Denials and the share of denials that result in litigation are equilibrium objects
that jointly determine the tutela rate. We show that the tutela rate (which is observed) is
a scalar multiple of unmet demand (which is unobserved). The model makes clear the
determinants of movements in the tutela rate, and the role of demand vs supply forces, see
Section 4 and Appendix Section A.
We investigate impacts of unmet demand on mortality, a widely used marker of pop-
ulation health. We demonstrate the presumed mechanism by showing that utilization of
medical services is decreasing in unmet demand. This provides a profile of the size and
scope of the impact of restrictions. It validates our approach of proxying unmet demand
with judicial claims. Importantly, it also makes it unlikely that our results for mortality are
driven by demand side variation. This is because demand shocks will tend to move health
service utilization and mortality in the same direction. In contrast, we expect supply side
denials to reduce service utilization and increase mortality.
We nevertheless adopt an empirical strategy that increases our confidence that we isolate
supply-side restrictions from demand-side factors. By virtue of using insurer-municipality-
year data, we are able to control not only for cross-sectional heterogeneity at the insurer-
municipality level but also for shocks at the insurer level and at the municipality level.6 To
address the concern that there remain relevant omitted variables that vary at the insurer-
municipality-year level, we additionally introduce an instrumental variables approach that
isolates supply side variation, see Section 5.
To provide an external check on the estimates obtained using tutela (judicial claims)
data, we obtained an alternative measure of unmet demand, which is the number of com-
plaints against health insurers made to the National Health Superintendent (Supersalud),
the agency in charge of oversight of the system. Between 2013 and 2017, the years for which
administrative data on complaints are available, there were 1.5 million individual complaints
against health insurers, the majority of which were related to restrictions imposed by in-
surers on access to requested medical services. Importantly, the claims and the complaints
are collected and managed by different agencies. An additional advantage of the complaints
data is that we can identify the age and sex of the plaintiff in these data, which allows us to
5The majority of the medical services restricted, more than 65%, are part of the mandatory benefits
package, and close to one-third are outside the benefit plan but are deemed necessary by an independent
health professional.
6These controls capture relevant baseline differences and shocks to health including infections, demo-
graphics, information, efficiency of provision, system-level changes, cultures of claiming or the leniency of
local courts.
3
analyze heterogeneity in the effects of complaints on health outcomes along these dimensions.
We find large effects of denials (unmet demand) on population-level mortality rates.
The marginal effects are similar irrespective of whether we use judicial claims (tutelas) or
complaints as the measure of unmet demand. The results are also broadly similar whether
or not we use an instrument, increasing our confidence that selection is not a major issue.
Using the IV specification we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the tutela
rate is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.23 standard deviations of the
mortality rate (which corresponds to an increase of between 8.7 and 20.2 percent in the
average mortality rate). These numbers translate to between 310 and 720 additional deaths
per year.7 Mortality rates are used as a measure of population health because they are
consistently available over a long period of time from vital statistics data. However, mortality
is an extreme measure that represents the tip of the iceberg of underlying morbidities. We
might therefore regard our estimates for mortality as a lower bound of the impact of denials
on population health.
The impact of denials on mortality is pervasive, being evident across cause of death,
age, sex and broad income groups. The strongest impacts are on mortality rates due to
certain cancers, which is consistent with the fact that the diagnoses more commonly invoked
in tutela claims are neoplasms. Impacts are stronger among people over the age of 50 and
(weakly) women. The standardized effects are larger in the subsidized regime (SR) that
covers the lower income population, albeit the uncertainty associated with the parameters
estimates is large enough that the difference relative to the contributory regime (CR) is not
always statistically significant.
We proceeded to estimate the extent to which denials hamper health service utilization,
a direct measure of denials, and the driver of increased mortality. We estimate that a one
standard deviation increase of the tutela rate reduces the per capita number of hospital-
izations by 0.54 standard deviations, of emergencies by 0.46 standard deviations, and of
consultations with health professionals by 0.71 standard deviations. Estimates for medical
procedures are not statistically significant when using the tutela rate, but when we use the
complaints rate they are. Thus denials reduce utilization of the full range of medical services.
We also find that they reduce utilization across the range of common diagnoses. As indicated
earlier, these results not only delineate a mechanism but also validate the use of tutelas (or
complaints) as a measure of denials.
We investigated whether unmet demand is greater in municipalities with weaker insurer
7Although not directly comparable in concept or context, to benchmark these effect sizes, we note that
studies analyzing Medicaid expansion in the US have found impacts of health insurance coverage on mortality
in a wide range, from no effect (Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008; Weathers and Stegman, 2012) to a reduction
in all-cause mortality of 6.1 percent (Sommers et al., 2012).
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level competition, and found no significant association. We similarly find no evidence that
increased mortality emerges from municipalities where insurers face lower competition. This
is consistent with a recently evolving literature on the industrial organization of health care
markets which shows, for the American market, that the impact of insurer competition on
welfare, negotiated provider prices, and premia is theoretically ambiguous (Ho and Lee,
2017). In our setting too, it is unclear that enforcing more competition will induce better
provision, for instance because greater market power may enhance the bargaining power of
insurers when negotiating contracts with providers, generating cost reductions that lower
the incentive to impose restrictions on demand.
Our study is relevant in light of the current wave of expansion in health care provision
in many countries, enhanced by a global agenda for universal health coverage. Despite
considerable expansions in coverage, the WHO estimates that at least half of all people in the
world do not receive the health care they need. With public budgets often stretched, issues
of effective delivery and accountability are increasingly important. Our results highlight the
costs to population health and to the public purse associated with the incentives of providers
being unaligned with constitutional commitments. There is too much regulation insofar as
insurers are not allowed to set prices or select enrollees and, at the same time, too little
regulation insofar as insurers are not penalized when complaints against them are received
and upheld.
We discuss broadly related research in Section 7, but here we briefly delineate where the
contributions of this paper lie. Our work is related to a literature studying the health effects
of expanding health insurance coverage which highlights the importance of studying outcomes
alongside access (see, among others, Baicker et al. (2013); Miller et al. (2013); Gruber et al.
(2014); Goodman-Bacon (2018)) We contribute to this literature by identifying the extent
to which slippage between coverage and access can hamper the realization of the potential
benefits of coverage. Although the incentive structure that allows insurers to restrict access
to health care is particular to the Colombian system, analogous problems arise whenever
health insurance coverage does not guarantee effective access to medical care. For instance,
studies of Medicaid have noted supply shortages and uncompetitive physician fees (Currie
et al., 1995; Government Accountability Office, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2014; Polsky et al., 2015;
Oostrom et al., 2017), as well as administrative burdens that distort physicians’ behavior
and reduce the availability of providers, with potentially harmful effects on patients (Cutler
and Ly, 2011; Dillender, 2018; Dunn et al., 2021). We contribute by identifying the size and
spread of the unmet demand for medical services and the associated population-level health
costs of denying medical care.
Our work is also related to a literature studying how the use of litigation by patients can
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influence provision of health care. Economists have focused upon the effects of liabilities for
malpractice on the quality and cost of medical care (Kessler and McClellan, 1996; Danzon,
2000; Currie and MacLeod, 2008; Frakes and Jena, 2016). We depart from this thread by
focusing upon a context in which litigation is used not to deter medical malpractice, but to
enforce access to medical care, supported by the constitutionalization of health as a human
right. We do not (cannot) analyse impacts of judicial accountability for the right to health.
Instead we exploit the fact that judicial claims carry information on denials of prescribed
medical treatments that are, in general, undocumented to analyse impacts of denials, condi-
tional on judge leniency. Our setting draws attention to issues of constitutional design and
accountability, highlighting a lacuna in modeling the constitutionalization of citizen rights.
An explicit commitment to fulfilling rights such as the right to health or education or food
increases salience and, when supported by the powers of a constitutional court, provides a
compelling framework for enactment of human rights law. We are unaware of research that
evaluates the incentive structure or the welfare consequences of this framework. In broadly
related work, Fox and Stephenson (2011) model judicial review, analyzing its impacts on
the incentives of elected leaders to posture by enacting bold but possibly ill-advised policies,
and on voter welfare. Maskin and Tirole (2004) consider the implications of constitutional
design for public choices, analysing the strengths and weaknesses of electoral accountability
and the role of non-accountable officials including judges.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 outlines the relevant features of the
Colombian health care system and the process of judicialization of access to health care.
Section 3 describes the data sources. Section 4 discusses a theoretical framework. The
econometric model and identification strategy are presented in Section 5. In Sections 6 and
7 we present and discuss the results and robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Policy Context
Structure. The health care system in Colombia is organized as a tightly regulated man-
aged competition model of health insurance.8 Individuals enter the system by enrolling with
a health insurer operating in their municipality of residence. The insurance company is
responsible for guaranteeing enrollees access to required medical services through their in-
dependently contracted network of providers (e.g. hospitals, clinics, laboratories). Citizens
can freely choose which insurer to enroll with, and which providers within the insurer net-
8For a characterization of the managed competition model of health insurance see Enthoven (1978);
Londoño and Frenk (1997). We provide an overview of characteristics relevant for our analysis, an in-depth
description is available in Gaviria et al. (2007); Maya (2008); Glassman et al. (2009). Analysis of the SR is
provided in Miller et al. (2013).
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work to use. There are two regimes that have a common structure but differ in their target
populations: the contributory regime (CR) covers formal sector employees and those in self-
employment that are able to pay, while the subsidized regime (SR) covers the low-income
population. Affiliation to the CR is mandatory for all formal employees, while eligibility for
the SR is means-tested.9
Insurers are constrained by regulation of three key strategic variables. First, insurers
cannot set premia, but instead receive a standardized risk-adjusted capitation payment per
enrollee which is defined annually by the government.10 Second, they must offer a stan-
dardized compulsory benefit package (known as POS) that includes preventive care services
and essential procedures and medications.11 Finally, insurers cannot deny enrollment on
the basis of demographics or pre-existing conditions, so they cannot directly engage in risk
selection.12
The high coverage of the system is a marker of success. The average share of the
population enrolled with an insurer in either the CR or the SR between 2010 and 2018
was 89 percent (Appendix Figure B.1), with half of the covered population in each regime.
Between 2010 and 2018, there were 80 active insurers on average per year in the country, 48
in the CR and 32 in the SR. The average number of insurers per municipality was 6.5 in the
CR, and 4.2 in the SR (Panel (a) of Appendix Figure B.2).13
Restrictions. There is extensive evidence that insurers have been systematically imposing
barriers to limit utilization of medical services (Maya, 2008; Abadia et al., 2009; Yamin and
Parra-Vera, 2009; Rodŕıguez, 2012; Arrieta-Gómez, 2018). These barriers take the form of
9The contributory regime regime is financed by payroll contributions and corporate income taxes, while
the subsidized regime is financed by ‘solidarity’ contributions from the CR and transfers from both sub-
national governments and the central government.
10There is a cost-sharing scheme through co-payments for outpatient care services that applies only to
individuals in the contributory regime who earn more than twice the minimum wage (Buitrago et al., 2021).
However, only a small fraction of the population is affected by these co-payments, partly because half of
enrollees in the system are in the subsidized regime, and partly because the threshold value of twice the
minimum wage is above the seventh decile of the income distribution. Importantly, co-payments don’t vary
across insurers.
11If a required service or medication is not included in the benefits package, users have to pay for it
unless it is deemed to be essential and they lack the resources to cover the cost. In such cases, the insurer
has to guarantee the timely provision of the service and the government reimburses the insurer for the cost
incurred.
12The capitation can vary by age, gender, municipality of residence and regime, but is common across
insurers conditional on these variables. The composition of the POS is also common across insurers, being
defined by the Ministry of Health and changed periodically. It is designed to be comprehensive enough to
cover most health care needs of the population.
13Approximately 10 percent of municipalities have a single insurer in the SR (Panel (b) Appendix Figure
B.2), while between 10 and 20 percent of all municipalities have at most two insurers in the CR (see Panel
(c) of Appendix Figure B.2).
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delays or denials of authorizations for exams, medicines, surgeries or treatments prescribed
by an independent health professional.14 This is a well known problem inside the country and
press articles documenting these practices abound (see Appendix Figure B.3). That insurers
have an incentive to impose these barriers is largely explained by the pay-structure they
face: they are mostly financed by capitation payments, which are set at a constant rate for
the year, but the costs they incur are variable and directly determined by the utilization of
care services. It is then in the financial interest of insurers to limit utilization of services and
medications so as to reduce variable costs. Although some limitations on health care use can
be efficient (counterbalancing demand-side incentives leading to ex post moral hazard) others
may be inefficient and harmful (Miller et al., 2013). The financial incentive is compounded
by the inability of the agencies in charge of oversight of the health care system to enforce
the law, which prohibits these practices (Maya, 2008; Corte Constitucional, 2008; Rodŕıguez,
2012).
Tutela Writs. In response to restrictions citizens have increasingly used judicial claims
available to them under Colombian law, the most salient being the tutela writ. The Colom-
bian Political Constitution, enacted in 1991, explicitly recognized a broad set of fundamental
rights for all its residents, among which is the right to health.15 Crucially, the Constitution
not only recognized the rights, it also created a legal enforcement mechanism, called the
tutela writ. This is a legal claim designed to get express access to the judicial system when
rights are violated. The claim is i) costless; ii) can be filed with any judge within the local
jurisdiction; iii) need only contain the basic facts so that a judge can address the case; and
iv) has preferential proceeding so that the judge has to return a decision in the first instance
within 10 days.
The Constitutional Court of Colombia has stated explicitly that when insurers impose
barriers to access health services, even those that are not included in the mandatory benefit
14For example, an insurer may impose an inappropriate administrative cost, pecuniary or other, that, if
not met, leads to a delay or rejection of an authorization. They might exploit ‘gray areas’ in the definition
of the benefits package, arguing that a part of a treatment, examination or medication was not explicitly
included in the benefit package, so as to delay or deny the entire treatment.
15The right to health is broadly defined as the right to access health services in a timely and efficient
manner so as to allow for the preservation, improvement and promotion of health. See Articles 44, 48 and
49 of the Colombian Political Constitution.
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package, it constitutes a violation of the right to health.16 An individual can file a tutela
against an insurer when a service is delayed or denied and, if the judge decides in favor of
the claimant, the insurer is forced to provide it. No additional penalty is imposed upon
the insurer beyond the mandate to authorize the services requested. Since some denials do
not lead to tutela claims and some claims are not granted, this generates an incentive for
the insurer to continue to restrict access. Due to its simplicity and the fast turnaround,
the tutela has progressively become a very popular instrument in the country. The number
of tutelas invoking any fundamental right increased from 0.3 to 12.7 per 1,000 inhabitants
between 1992 and 2016 (See Panel (a) of Figure 1),17 with tutela writs invoking the right
to health accounting for 20 to 40 percent of all claims. The growth over time has been
substantial: in 1999, the total number of tutelas presented to courts invoking the right to
health was 21,301 (0.53 per 1,000 inhabitants), but by 2016 the number reached 163,977
(3.36 per 1,000 inhabitants), a more than sevenfold increase in a span of 17 years.18
Four features of the data on tutelas invoking the right to health are noteworthy: first,
between 65.9 and 82.4 percent are made against insurers (Panel (a) of Figure B.4).19 Second,
more than 65% of the services requested in tutela writs during the period of analysis were
part of the compulsory benefit package (Panel (b) of Figure B.4). This shows that a large
share of litigation is to access services that people should be able to get without going to
court.20 Third, between 72.2 and 86 percent of tutelas are decided in the first instance
16In section 3.2.1.3 of sentence T-760 of 2008, the Court states: “The Constitutional jurisprudence has
indicated that access to a required health service, contemplated in the mandatory plans, is an autonomous
fundamental right. To this extent, the denial of health services contemplated in the POS is a violation of the
fundamental right to health, therefore, it is a clearly enforceable and justiciable provision through a Tutela
writ.”. Later on, discussing services not included in the mandatory benefit package, it states that “when a
person requires a health service that is not included in the Mandatory Benefit Plan, and lacks resources to
cover its cost, the entities in charge of ensuring the provision of the service must adhere to their responsibility
and, consequently, ensure access to it. However, it is the State that has to bear the cost of the service, since
it has the obligation to guarantee the effective enjoyment of the right.” Corte Constitucional (2008).
17Unless stated otherwise, the statistics reported in this section are taken from reports produced by the
Colombian Ombudsman office (Defensoŕıa del Pueblo, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015) and
the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (Ministerio de Salud y Proteccion Social, 2018).
18The extent to which individuals were using tutela writs invoking the right to health during the early
2000s led the Colombian Constitutional Court to make a major pronouncement: Ruling T-760 of 2008. In the
ruling, the Court provided a thorough analysis of the problems that led to the judicialization of the health
care system, and ordered a set of changes including i) full clarity about the procedures and medications
that were included in the benefit packages; ii) periodical audits of the insurers in order to inform users of
their performance; iii) strengthening the regulatory agency overlooking the system; and iv) a revision of the
capitation payments that had been unchanged for several years. The number of tutelas invoking the right
to health declined temporarily between 2008 and 2009, but by 2015 they were back to the pre-ruling levels.
We can only study the period after the 2008 pronouncement because the tutela data are only available after
then.
19Less than 4 percent are made against providers and between 15 and 30 percent are made against local
authorities, governmental agencies or other actors in the system.
20The remaining 35% of claims are nevertheless for medical services prescribed by a medical professional.
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in favor of the claimant (Panel (c) of Figure B.4). This implies that, in the eyes of the
Colombian jurisprudence, citizen claims are more often than not recognized as valid. Fourth,
although the share of enrollees in each regime is approximately equal, only between 12.7 and
36.7 percent of tutelas against insurers are made by individuals in the subsidized regime
(Panel (d) of Figure B.4). Thus the low-income population are less likely to use this judicial
instrument to protect their rights.
Complaints to the Supersalud. Tutela writs are a powerful legal instrument in Colom-
bia, but they are not the only mechanism that people have to enforce access to restricted
medical services. Individuals can also make complaints (and requests) to the National Health
Superintendent (Supersalud), the agency in charge of oversight of the health care system.
The Supersalud has the capacity to apply sanctions against insurers, which can range from
economic penalties to the removal of the license to operate, and can mediate in disputes be-
tween insurers and enrollees regarding access to requested services. The complaints process
is simple: citizens can file complaints to the Supersalud in person, on a telephone, in writing,
through an online platform or using the social network accounts (Facebook and Twitter) of
the agency. The Supersalud notifies the defendant, who is asked to respond to the complaint.
If mediation is necessary, the Supersalud makes a decision on the case within ten days.
Between 2013 and 2017, the years for which the data on complaints is available to us,
people made 1,513,247 complaints against insurers, an average of 6.92 complaints per 1,000
enrollees in the system per year. This number is 2.7 times larger than the tutela rate during
the same period21 (Panel (b) of Figure 1). Nevertheless, Tutelas and complaints are different
instruments that can both be used to enforce access to care services that were restricted.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of tutela against complaint rates for every insurer
× municipality × year cell.22 The correlation between the two instruments is 0.38.
3 Data
We use five sources of administrative data for the analysis. These data are available either
at the individual level for the entire population (vital statistics), as insurer × municipality
× year averages (enrollees, tutelas, complaints), or as municipal × year averages (health
21The higher rate of complaints relative to tutelas might reflect two differences between them: first, a
complaint is easier to make. The Supersalud provides many different channels for users to make complaints,
while to file a tutela you need to write and deliver a document to a judge. Second, for a judge to rule a tutela
in favor of the claimant the individual not only has to show that access to a health service was restricted,
but that this restriction violates their right to health.
22Between 2013 and 2016, the years for which the data on tutelas and complaints overlap, we have 44,619
observations at insurer × municipality × year level.
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services register). There are 1,120 municipalities, 80 insurers on average per year,23 and, in
the most comprehensive dataset, we have information for 2010–2017.
Vital Statistics. As a marker of the population-level health costs of denials, we use
overall, cause-specific, age-specific, and sex-specific mortality rates at the level of insurer ×
municipality × year between 2010 and 2017, which we calculate from individual data on
mortality. We use mortality because it is one of the few objective, well-measured health out-
comes available over time (Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008), and because the vital statistics
registers include information on the municipality of residence of the deceased and the insurer
with which he or she was enrolled, if enrolled.24
Enrollment. We use data on the total number of enrollees in each insurer × munici-
pality × year during 2010–2017. This information is publicly available on the website of the
Ministry of Health and Social Protection.
Tutelas. We use the number of tutelas filed against health insurers and invoking
the right to health. We obtained these data from the ombudsman’s office after we filed a
formal petition supported by right-to-information legislation. The data covers the universe
of health-related tutelas put forward to Colombian courts between the years 2010 and 2016.
The information is available at the insurer × municipality × year level. At this disaggregated
level, the data are restricted to the number of claims made, so we cannot differentiate by
the type of medical care requested or whether the claims were successful.
Complaints. We use the universe of complaints put forward to the National Health
Superintendent during 2013–2017. We can identify which insurance company is involved
in the complaint, the main (broad) reason for the complaint, and the age and sex of the
claimant. We only use complaints against health insurers. We further exclude complaints
about administrative procedures unrelated to the provision of health services and any general
information requests. These data were also obtained by us following a right to information
request.
Utilization of Health Services. We use data that contain all medical services effec-
tively supplied in each municipality × year during 2010–2017, obtained from the Ministry of
Health and Social Protection of Colombia and publicly available through an on-line platform
(SISPRO). This information can be disaggregated by type of service: consultation, hospital-
ization, procedure, or emergency; and by the medical diagnosis associated with it, classified
in ICD-10 codes. This information cannot be disaggregated by insurer.
23If an insurer is operating in both the subsidized or contributory regime we treat it as two different
entities.
24Information about the insurer of the deceased is only available starting in 2008.
11
4 Theoretical Framework
In this section we discuss the theoretical framework that underlies our empirical strategy.
A formalization is presented in Appendix Section A, here we provide a simplified schematic
description focusing on the salient features of the problem. The aim is to make explicit
the main factors that determine the decision of insurers to restrict access to a service, the
decision of enrollees to file tutelas or complaints, and to characterize what is meant by unmet
demand and how it relates to the prevalence of judicial claims.
The basic structure of the problem is summarized in the decision tree shown in Figure
3. To simplify, suppose there are only two periods, all agents are enrolled with a health
insurer, and tutelas (not complaints) are the only instrument available. In the initial period
individuals observe their health status, and, if required, get prescribed a treatment, procedure
or medication. In the context of the Colombian health care system, these prescriptions
can be authorized or denied/delayed (henceforth restricted) by the health insurer (even
though suggested by a medical professional). Any medical service that is prescribed but
not readily authorized is enforceable through litigation, but not all individuals choose to use
legal instruments. This is captured by the separation in the branches leading to end node
B on the one hand, and end nodes C and D on the other. Since only a fraction of tutelas
are decided in favor of the plaintiff, i) some restricted services will not be delivered (i.e. end
nodes B or C); and ii) some restricted services will be delivered as a result of litigation (i.e.
end node D). In the final period, new health outcomes are realized.
Let αi be the fraction of enrollees in insurer i that file tutelas conditional on having
their requested services restricted. In terms of the decision tree, αi corresponds to the ratio
of enrollees that end up in nodes C or D, relative to the total number of enrollees in nodes
B,C, or D. It follows that
Tutelai = αiRestrictioni, (4.1)
where Restrictioni is the fraction of enrollees that face restrictions and Tutelai is the fraction
of enrollees that file tutelas. Equation 4.1 describes the direct link between the tutela rate,
which we observe, and the restriction rate, which we do not observe.
Both αi and Restrictioni are equilibrium objects that jointly determine Tutelai. We
show in Appendix Section A that αi is i) increasing in the (average) improvements in health
agent’s get from receiving the restricted care services; and ii) increasing in the (average)
probability that litigation is decided in favor of the plaintiff. On the other hand, Restrictioni
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is i) increasing in the (average) cost of providing the services; ii) decreasing in the (average)
probability that litigation is decided in favor of the plaintiff; and iii) decreasing in αi. These
results clarify that it is not the case that restrictions are typically on expensive treatments
(and, indeed, the data reveal that tutelas are claimed for all sorts of treatments, expensive
and not, see Appendix Figure B.5). This is because some expensive treatments are for life-
threatening conditions that citizens are more likely to litigate for and that judges are more
likely to deem valid.25
As long as receiving medical care cannot worsen health, with the demand for medical
care held constant, a larger (supply-side driven) restriction rate will translate into worse
average health outcomes among the population. It follows from Equation 4.1 that an increase
in the restriction rate that is not demand driven will be reflected in a higher tutela rate and
associated with i) lower utilization of health care services and ii) a higher mortality rate.
These are the two key empirical predictions of the model that we test.
The predicted associations will be attenuated by the fact that a fraction of services
are delivered after favorable judicial rulings (node D).26 But the fact that some services are
nevertheless restricted implies there is an unmet demand for health care, defined as the share
of services that are requested but not delivered. More formally,











Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows the raw correlation between the (log) tutela and (log)
mortality rates using municipality × insurer × year data. Panel (c) replicates the exercise
using the complaint rate. Consistent with the model predictions, there is a clear positive
association. We argue that this reflects the impact of restricting access to health services on
health outcomes, as described in Equation 4.1, which results in an unrealized demand for
health care, as described in Equation 4.2. We now proceed to discuss the empirical strategy
used to test this hypothesis.
25The probability that litigation is decided in favor of the plaintiff may vary across municipalities with
judge leniency. Judge leniency would be an instrument for claims granted, while we want an instrument for
the volume of claims made. This is because we ask a different question, which is what the health cost of
denials & delays is. In our analysis, judge leniency is absorbed by municipality or municipality-year fixed
effects.
26If some judges are more lenient than others, this is captured by municipality x year fixed effects.
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5 Empirical Strategy
For expositional purposes we focus here on tutela rates, but each model is also estimated using
complaint rates, an alternative and independently generated measure of unmet demand.
Since each observation corresponds to an average (i.e. a rate) over the enrollees in the
insurer-municipality-year triplet, we apply analytical weights in the estimation.27
5.1 Supply Restrictions and Mortality: Three-Way Fixed Effects and IV
We first estimate a model of the form:
Morti,m,t = τTutelai,m,t + δXi,m,t + φm,t + θi,t + ϕi,m + εi,m,t, (5.1)
where i ∈ {1 . . . I} indexes health insurers, m ∈ {1 . . .M} indexes municipalities, and t ∈
{1 . . . T} indexes years, Morti,m,t is the mortality rate, Tutelai,m,t is the rate of tutela claims,
φm,t are municipality specific flexible time trends; θi,t are health insurer specific flexible time
trends; and ϕi,m are municipality × health insurer fixed effects. Xi,m,t are time-varying
covariates. The main identification challenge is to isolate the variation in the tutela rate
induced by supply-side restrictions from demand driven changes. Once that is done, the
parameter τ can be interpreted as the effect of supply side restrictions to medical care access
on mortality.
In the theoretical framework, we derived that Tutelai,m,t = αi,m,tRestrictioni,m,t, where
αi,m,t ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of enrollees that file tutelas conditional on having a service
restricted. The equation makes clear that we need to consider factors influencing the restric-
tion rate and the prevalence of litigation (see Section 4 and Appendix Section A). The likely
drivers of demand for both are absorbed by the fixed effects.
In particular we are able to control not only for cross-sectional heterogeneity at the
insurer-municipality level ϕi,m but also for shocks at the insurer level θi,t and at the munici-
pality level φm,t.
28
To address the concern that there remain relevant omitted variables that vary at the
insurer-municipality-time level, we additionally introduce an instrumental variables approach.
We leverage the fact that insurers operate across multiple municipalities. The instrument
rests on the premise that insurer-specific (supply side) factors determine the restriction rate
27All results are qualitatively unchanged if we estimate an unweighted regression.
28These controls capture relevant baseline differences and/or shocks to health including infections, demo-
graphics, information, efficiency of provision, system-level changes, cultures of claiming or the leniency of
local courts.
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in a way that is orthogonal to local demand for health care. Natural examples of insurer-
specific supply side factors are cost structures determined by different service provider con-
tracts, and different managerial practices.29 The instrument is the insurer-specific change in
the tutela rate, calculated using the information from all municipalities in which the insurer





where νi,k,t ≡ Ni,k,t∑
k 6=mNi,k,t
, and Ni,k,t is the total number of enrollees in health insurer i, mu-
nicipality k, and year t. In practice, we calculate Zi,m,t using only municipalities outside the
department in which m is located to allow for correlated demand shocks between munici-
palities that are close to each other. The exclusion restriction holds if the restriction rate
in municipalities outside the department where m is located, conditional on the structure of
fixed effects described above, does not directly affect the mortality rate in municipality m.
The time-varying covariates Xi,m,t include the one-period lagged mortality rate which
captures average health outcomes in the previous year and accounts for the possibility of
mean-reversion. Although this is not common practice because most municipalities have
only a few insurers (Appendix Figure B.2), and bureaucratic barriers make switching costly,
we want to account for the possibility that people switch to other insurers due to restrictions,
changing the risk-profile of enrollees. To do this, we include the market share of the health
insurer in the municipality-year30, and the change in that market share from the previous
year.
5.2 Supply Restrictions and Utilization of Health Services: Shift-Share - IV
The mechanism through which restrictions affect health outcomes is by limiting the utiliza-
tion of health care services. We test this prediction using a similar strategy. As the health
services data are only available at the municipal × year level, we modify the empirical strat-
egy, using a shift-share IV. The premise remains that insurer-specific restriction rates are
correlated across municipalities because of supply side determinants that are orthogonal to
local demand for health care. The estimated model takes the form:
29In terms of the model parameters, the cost structure would be captured by the distribution of cxi , and
efficiency would be reflected in the value of c̃i.
30Market share is defined as total share of enrollees the health insurer has within the municipality.
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ym,t = πTutelam,t + γWi,m,t + φm + εm,t, (5.3)
where ymt is a measure of health services used, including patient consultations, hospital-
izations, procedures and emergencies, all defined on a per 1,000 enrollees basis. Wi,m,t is
a vector of controls, and φm is a municipality fixed effect. To construct the instrument,
note that the municipal tutela rate is a weighted average of the tutela rates of each insurer





where νi,m,t is the municipal share of enrollees of insurer i at time t. We can decompose
Tutelai,m,t into an aggregate, insurer level rate, and an idiosyncratic, municipal level rate:
Tutelai,m,t = Tutela
¬m
i,t + µi,m,t, (5.5)
where Tutela¬mi,t is the tutela rate of insurer i at time t at the national level, calculated leaving
out municipality m. As before, we calculate Tutela−mi,t using only municipalities outside the
department in which m is located. The instrument is then constructed to utilize variation







where νi,m,t0 is the municipal share of enrollees of insurer i in a baseline year t0 = 2010.
Defining the market share in the baseline year ameliorates concerns that people might switch
insurers because of restrictions, which would endogenously change the risk-pool distribution.
Like all shift-share IV’s, the instrument has two components: First, how exposed a
municipality is to restrictions by an insurer, given by the respective market share νi,m,t0 .
Second, how many restrictions were imposed by each insurer on average outside the mu-
nicipality m, proxied by the tutela rate. The recent literature on shift-share IV shows that
validity of the instrument in this set-up can be argued in terms of the exposure variables




et al., 2021). In our setting, both alternatives are plausible, but, following the discussion
in the previous section, we argue that the restriction rate in municipalities outside the de-
partment where m is located is unrelated to local demand for health care, which implies
exogeneity of the aggregate shocks. To further account for local demand changes and allow
for mean reversion, we include in the vector of controls Wm,t one-period lags of the mortality
rate and of each of the four utilization rates.
6 Results
6.1 Restrictions and Mortality
The estimates are presented in Table 1. We show results with and without the instrument,
and with and without the time-varying controls. We consistently provide estimates for both
tutela and complaint rates as these provide alternative sources of variation in the same
underlying variable (restrictions), see Section 2. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument
in the first stage is shown and, in all cases, is above 30, which indicates the instrument has
sufficient power. There is no evidence of mean reversion.
An increase in supply side restrictions on access to health services leads to an increase
in the mortality rate that is robust to the alternative specifications and to both measures. It
is both statistically significant and meaningful. The point estimates range between 0.117 (se
0.014) and 0.271 (se 0.053). To get a sense of magnitude, this implies that a one standard
deviation (SD) increase in the tutela rates –an increase of 2.55 tutelas per 1,000 enrollees–
is associated with an increase of between 0.10 and 0.23 SD of the mortality rate. The
standardized estimates using complaints data are strikingly similar- a one SD increase of
the complaint rate –an increase of 4.01 complaints per 1,000 enrollees– is associated with
an increase of between 0.12 and 0.21 SD of the mortality rate. These results corroborate
the hypothesis that restrictions have important effects on average health outcomes, even on
a health outcome as extreme as the mortality rate. The actual incidence of restrictions on
population health will be larger as it will tend to include unmeasured impacts on morbidities
that do not translate into mortality.
By Regime. In Table 2 we repeat the analysis, dividing the sample between the contrib-
utory (CR) and subsidized (SR) regimes, which have different target populations, the SR
covering the most economically vulnerable segments of the population. Earlier we noted
(Panel (b) of Figure 1) that tutela and complaint rates are significantly larger in the CR
than the SR, which suggests that the CR population either faces more restrictions or has
a greater tendency to use judicial instruments. It is hard to identify which, but both are
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plausible. We display only the specifications with the full set of controls. The F-statistic on
the excluded instrument of the first stage is above 10 in all cases.
In both regimes we find evidence that supply side restrictions lead to an increase in mor-
tality rates. The standardized effects are larger in the SR, albeit the uncertainty associated
with the parameters estimates implies that the differences are not always statistically sig-
nificant. Going by the magnitudes, it appears that despite the extension of universal health
cover to the lower income population, restrictions on access have more severe consequences
in this group. This may be because they are less likely to make use of judicial instruments
to gain access, or because their baseline health is worse making it more likely that any level
of restriction translates into mortality in this group.
The IV results indicate that, in the CR, a one SD increase in tutelas and complaints
respectively leads to increases of 0.09 and 0.16 SD of the mortality rate. In the SR, a one
SD increase in each of the two measures leads to an increase of 0.38 and 0.41 SD deviations
of the mortality rate respectively.
By Cause of Death. A notable feature of judicial claims is that people request all forms
of medical care supported by a wide range of medical diagnoses. Panel (a) of Figure B.5)
shows that of all tutelas between 2000 and 2015, 9.3% requested appointments with health
specialists, 12.8% requested exams, 15.5% surgeries, 17.1% medications, and 18.0% treat-
ments. Moreover, a recent report by the Ministry of Heath and Social Protection (Ministerio
de Salud y Proteccion Social, 2018) shows that 11.6% of tutelas are supported by medical
diagnoses of neoplasia, 9.9% refer to diseases of the nervous system and 8.7% to diseases of
the circulatory system (Panel (b) of Figure B.5).
Although denials appear pervasive, some health conditions require more urgent or com-
prehensive care, making it plausible that the impact of restrictions varies by cause. We
therefore investigate cause-specific mortality rates, see Figure 4. We do not have tutelas
and complaints by cause, so we use the municipality-insurer-year level rate as before. To
facilitate exposition, we focus on the 15 most prevalent causes of death according to the
classification of diseases defined by the Colombian National Statistical Agency, which has 71
categories, and we only report results for the IV specification using tutela rates. The Figure
displays both the coefficient estimates and the standardized effects.
There are two main takeaways from this exercise. First, all of the point estimates are
positive, and most are statistically significant at standard levels, indicating that restrictions
increase mortality rates pretty much across the spectrum. This is consistent with the wide
range of diagnoses supporting the tutela claims. Second, some conditions exhibit a stronger
response to restrictions. The standardized effect on the mortality rate from certain forms of
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cancers and sequelae of accidents and assaults is between 0.12 and 0.13 standard deviations,
and from cerebrovascular, respiratory and cancer of pancreas is close to 0.10 standard devi-
ations. In contrast, the impacts on mortality from stomach cancer and pulmonary disease is
relatively small, lying between 0.03 and 0.04 standard deviations.
Mortality by Age and Sex The information on complaints is available at the individual
level, allowing us to identify both the age group and the sex of the person affected in the
complaint (who is not necessarily the person who files the claim), so we can create group
specific rates. The information on vital statistics is also available at the individual level, so
we can construct group specific mortality rates. Combining the two sources we can estimate
the three-way fixed effects model for different subsamples.31
As a starting point, Panels (a) and (b) of Figure B.6 show the average complaint and
mortality rates for males and females and for four age groups: 0-5, 6-24, 25-49, and 50
or above. Two patterns are evident in the data: first, complaint rates have a U-shaped
pattern across age groups. The lowest rate is at age 6-24, while the largest is at age 50-plus.
Second, the complaint rate tends to be larger for females. In both cases, differences could
be explained either by a higher propensity to make complaints, or by a higher prevalence of
restrictions. It seems plausible that older people, who are more vulnerable to chronic disease
which is relatively expensive to treat, face greater restrictions.
The estimated effects are presented in Figure 5. To facilitate exposition, we report
results only for the instrumental variable specification with the full set of controls. The
standardized effects show larger impacts of restrictions on older people. The impact on
mortality rates for individuals above 50 years of age is close to 0.16 standard deviations.
This is consistent with the conditions of older people being more sensitive to access to
medical care. The standardized effect is slightly larger for females than for males (0.14 vs.
0.11 SD), although we cannot reject that they are equal at standard levels of significance.
Alternative Instrument As a robustness check on the parameter estimates and to im-
prove comparisons with the results in the next section, Table 3 shows the results of estimat-
ing Equation 5.3 using the municipal-year (rather than the municipal-insurer-year) mortality
rate as the dependent variable. For comparability, we report the same specifications as those
in Table 1. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument of the first stage is above 10. Re-
sults using this alternative IV strategy are similar to those from the three-way fixed effects
31We cannot identify age and sex in the tutela data, but impacts of tutela and complaint rates on
aggregated mortality rates were similar.
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approach and the corresponding IV.32
For the instrumental variable specification that includes the full set of controls, the
point estimates show that a one SD increase of the tutela rate is associated with an increase
of 0.26 SD in the mortality rate. A similar movement of the complaint rate distribution is
associated with an increase of 0.18 SD of the mortality rate. The corresponding numbers
for the same specification in Table 1 were 0.23 and 0.12 standard deviations. The somewhat
larger impacts observed once we aggregate across insurers to get municipality level mortality
rates are consistent with the aggregated data incorporating externalities. Externalities may
be generated by infection transmission that influences the demand for health, or information
transmission that influences litigation conditional on demand.
Overall, the results described in this section provide compelling evidence that restrictions
in access to health care are imposing significant health costs on the population. The identified
increases in mortality rates are robust to varying the controls (two and three way fixed
effects models, time-varying controls), the estimator (with and without IV, and varying the
instrument) and the measure (tutela vs complaint rates). This stability of the estimates
mitigates concerns that selection drives our results. In the next section, we investigate
impacts of restrictions on the likely mechanism- the utilization of health care services. This
allows us not only to verify the mechanism in principle but also to identify the size of these
effects, and their distribution by service type.
Competition A mechanism that could explain the prevalence of supply-side restrictions
is limited competition between insurers within municipalities. As shown in Panel (a) of
Appendix Figure B.2, the average number of insurers per municipality was 6.5 in the CR,
and 4.2 in the SR, but these numbers conceal important heterogeneities: approximately
10 percent of municipalities have a single insurer in the SR (Panel (b) Appendix Figure
B.2), while between 10 and 20 percent of all municipalities have at most two insurers in
the CR (see Panel (c) of Appendix Figure B.2). Moreover, the average cross-municipality
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration, defined in terms of the share
of enrollees, is 5,251 in the contributory regime and 5,463 in the subsidized regime. This is
more than twice the lower threshold used by the Justice Department of the United States
to classify an industry as highly concentrated.
To investigate the role of competition, we estimated Equation 5.3 interacting the tutela
or complaint rates with the HHI index, or with alternative binary classifications of munici-
palities based on the HHI index. We find no clear evidence that impacts of restrictions on
32The IV estimates are broadly similar. The OLS estimates are more sensitive (they are smaller), consis-
tent with the fixed effects capturing considerably less heterogeneity in the more aggregate, municipal level,
specifications.
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mortality emerge predominantly from low-competition markets- the interaction term is, in
general, statistically insignificant at standard levels across specifications.33 This is not en-
tirely surprising. For example, higher market concentration can generate economies of scale
or increase the power that insurers have to negotiate lower prices with providers, reducing
the incentive to use denials as a way to control costs. These sorts of trade-offs have been
studied in the literature on the industrial organization of health care markets (Gaynor et al.,
2015; Ho and Lee, 2017), and they suggest that enforcing more competition may not be
enough to induce a better provision of the services.
6.2 Restrictions and Utilization of Health Services
Estimates of Equation 5.3 are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The first table considers hos-
pitalizations and emergencies and the second considers consultations and procedures, all
per 1,000 enrollees. We show results using both the fixed-effects OLS specification and the
shift-share IV and, as before, for tutela and complaint rates. The F-statistic on the excluded
instrument of the first stage is above 20. The mean and standard deviation of each variable
(reported in the tables) shows that, on average (per 1,000 enrollees) in a year there are 42.02
(SD 22.55) hospitalizations, 130.23 (SD) emergencies, 2,362 (SD 1,095) consultations with
health professionals, and 1,770 (SD 1,127) medical procedures.
The evidence is clear that supply side restrictions on access to medical care reduce all
types of service utilization.34 This result is not sensitive to specification. To get a sense of
magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the tutela rate reduces the rate of hospital-
izations by 0.54 SD, of emergencies by 0.46 SD, and of consultations with health professional
by 0.71 SD. A one SD increase in the complaint rate reduces the rate of hospitalizations by
0.63 SD, of emergencies by 0.25 SD, of consultations by 0.45 SD and of procedures by 0.32
SD. Although we do not detect a significant impact of the tutela rate on procedures in the
IV specification, once we use the complaint rate we do.
The results are robust and the effect sizes, relative to the reported means and SD are
large. These results indicate that restrictions on access are not temporary, or not only around
delay, but that there is a lot of outright denial. Moreover, the evidence lines up with the
results for mortality, delineating the mechanism and showing that it is active across the
different margins analyzed.
33We also find that the descriptive association of tutelas with the HHI is not statistically significant.
Results are available on request.
34If, for example, restrictions were predominantly on consultations then one might imagine that as (pre-
ventive) consultations fall, there are knock on effects that lead to an increase in hospitalizations and emer-
gencies. Thus, the direct effects seem to dominate any knock on effects of denials. It remains possible that




Our work is broadly related to a literature studying the health effects of expanding health
insurance coverage. Available research suggests that expanding health insurance increases
medical service utilization (Feldstein, 1977; Manning et al., 1987; Currie and Gruber, 1996a;
Gaviria et al., 2007; Finkelstein, 2007; Card et al., 2008; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Weathers
and Stegman, 2012; Baicker et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2013; Gruber et al., 2014; Goodman-
Bacon, 2018), but with mixed impacts on health outcomes. This highlights the importance of
studying outcomes alongside access. Health outcomes that have been shown to improve with
expansion of health insurance coverage in the United States include child mortality, birth
weight (Currie and Gruber, 1996a,b; Camacho and Conover, 2013; Chou et al., 2014; Gru-
ber et al., 2014; Goodman-Bacon, 2018), self-reported mental and physical health (Gaviria
et al., 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Weathers and Stegman, 2012; Baicker et al., 2013), and
all-cause mortality, especially among older adults and minorities (Sommers et al., 2012).
However, some studies find no effect on measured physical health outcomes (Baicker et al.,
2013) including mortality (Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008; Weathers and Stegman, 2012).
We contribute to this literature by identifying the extent to which slippage between coverage
and access can hamper the realization of the potential benefits of coverage.
Although the incentive structure that allows insurers to restrict access to health care
is particular to the Colombian system, analogous problems arise whenever health insurance
coverage does not guarantee effective access to medical care. For example, there is evidence
that Medicaid recipients in the United States face barriers to access ambulatory care because
of low rates of physician participation and shortages of primary care providers (MAG, 1994;
Currie et al., 1995; Government Accountability Office, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2014; Sonchak,
2015). Similarly, physicians treating Medicaid patients experience greater difficulty referring
them to speciality care relative to the privately insured (Government Accountability Office,
2011; Felland et al., 2013). These are examples of supply-side constraints that can lead to
an under-provision of medical services even when they are part of the benefit plan. However,
neither for the US, nor for any other country, are we aware of estimates of the population-level
health costs of denying medical care, and we make a contribution on this front.
We also contribute to a literature studying how the use of litigation by patients can
affect the provision of health care. Economists have focused upon the effects of liabilities for
malpractice on the quality and cost of medical care (Kessler and McClellan, 1996; Danzon,
2000; Kessler and McClellan, 2002; Currie and MacLeod, 2008; Frakes, 2013; Frakes and
Jena, 2016). Results from this literature indicate that the fear of tort liabilities encourages
physicians to engage in ‘defensive medicine’, administering treatments that potentially have
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little medical impact but that vastly increase the cost of providing health care. Some studies
show that reforms that reduce tort liabilities reduce both the number of lawsuits filed and
medical expenditures (Kessler and McClellan, 1996; CBO and Congressional Budget Office
of the United States, 2004), with no effect on mortality or the quality of care (Kessler and
McClellan, 1996; Frakes and Jena, 2016), although there is also evidence that, in specific
situations like childbirth, they can increase medical complications (Currie and MacLeod,
2008).
We depart from this literature by focusing upon a context in which litigation is used
not to deter medical malpractice, but to enforce access to medical care, supported by con-
stitutionalization of health as a human right. The idea of institutionalizing rights to health
has legal foundations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,35 and, more
explicitly, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
of 1966, a legally binding treaty signed and later ratified by 169 countries.36 The right to
health is explicitly recognized –to a greater or lesser extent– in the written constitutions of
more than half of all UN member countries (Kinney and Clark, 2004; Backman et al., 2008;
Hamel et al., 2015).
In some cases, this notional commitment is accompanied by constitutional provisions
to guarantee its enforcement, including the possibility of legal recourse. In Colombia, as
discussed, use of an enforcement mechanism has become widespread, leading to what is
referred as ‘judicialization of health care’ (Yamin and Parra-Vera, 2009, 2010; Parra-Vera
and Yamin, 2013). Although it seems less widespread in these countries, a similar provision
has been made available in Argentina (Bergallo, 2011), Brazil (Gauri, 2004; Biehl et al., 2009,
2012), Costa Rica (Wilson, 2011; Norheim et al., 2014), and South Africa (Cooper, 2011).37
Most of the literature studying judicial enforcement of the right to health is qualitative, often
focusing on individual cases or a small group of cases. We provide what appears to be the first
quantitative analysis, using unique data on judicial claims made to enforce access to medical
35Article 25 of the Declaration states that: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care...”
36The ICESCR declares in its Article 12 that “the States parties... recognize the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” It is not, according to the
standard interpretation, a right to be healthy, but a set of entitlements that include “the right to a system of
health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of
health,... taking into account both the individual’s biological and socio-economic preconditions and a State’s
available resources.” (Alston, 2010, general comment 14, N. 8-9).
37The United States has not ratified the ICESCR, and its constitution makes no reference to health rights,
but it has nevertheless experienced right to health litigation in specific segments of the population. In the
1976 landmark decision Estelle vs. Gamble, the Supreme Court of the United States established the right to
medical care for prisoners after a Texas inmate, J. W. Gamble, sued the State Department of Corrections
for lack of adequate medical treatment. The failure of correctional officials to honor these rights has resulted
in protracted litigation involving hundreds of cases (Rold, 2008; Hamel et al., 2015).
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care. Our study is particularly relevant in the context of sharp expansions in health care
provision across countries, enhanced by a global push for universal health coverage. Where
the incentives of providers are not necessarily aligned with constitutional commitments,
questions of effective delivery and accountability become increasingly important.
8 Conclusion
Our results provide evidence that supply-side restrictions on access to state-insured health
care services manifest as very substantial reductions in medical consultations, hospitaliza-
tions, emergency care and (with more uncertainty) medical procedures. In line with this, we
identify increases in mortality rates. The estimates are robust to varying the controls, the
estimator and the measure of restrictions (tutela vs complaint rates). They are pervasive
across social groups defined by economic and demographic characteristics, and across many
different causes of death. The standardized effects are larger in the lower income population,
among older people and (weakly) among women. Our results are relevant to newly emerging
health care insurance systems in developing countries. Identifying an effective design for
these new regimes is important both because public budgets are tight and because health
and economic status are more intricately tied among the poor. Our results are also more
widely relevant as richer countries are increasingly having to grapple with rising demand
that current provisions are, in general, unable to satisfy.
Colombia has made a constitutional commitment to the right to health and acted to
implement universal health care coverage ahead of many other countries. It has in place
a well-functioning, widely accessed institution designed to protect citizen rights. Yet, the
organization of delivery of health care services, which operates through insurance companies
(that are mostly but not entirely privately owned) suffers design deficiencies. There is too
much regulation insofar as insurers are not allowed to set prices or select enrollees and, at the
same time, too little regulation insofar as insurers are not penalized when complaints against
them are received and upheld. Our estimates provide a lower bound on the population level
health gains that can be achieved through re-design of the system.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Prevalence of Tutelas and Complaints
(a) Tutelas per 1,000 Inhabitants by Fundamental Right Being Invoked
(b) Number of Complaints and Tutelas per 1,000 Enrollees by Regime
Notes: The numbers reported in in the right-to-health series of Panel (a) include complaints made against
other actors in the system different from insurers (i.e. IPSs, Secretary of Health and Social Protection, local
authorities). See footnote 18 for a discussion on the peak of health related tutelas in 2008. The numbers in
Panel (b) are based on Defensoŕıa del Pueblo (2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015), and include
only complaints and tutelas made against insurers. 25
Figure 2: Correlations between Mortality, Tutela and Complaint Rates within Municipality, Insurer
and Year
(a) Tutela and Complaint Rate
(b) Mortality and Tutela Rate (c) Mortality and Complaint Rate
Notes: The scatter plot in Panel (a) shows the relation between the (log) of the tutela and (log)
complaint rates (plus one) defined at the municipality × insurer × year level. The scatter plot in
Panel (b) shows the relation between the (log) of the tutela and (log) mortality rates (plus one)
defined at the same level. Panel (c) repeats the exercise but using the complaint rate. The size of
each circle is proportional to the total share of enrollees. The approximate elasticity is measured
by the slope a regression of the respective variables. The sources of data to construct the figure are
described in Section 3.
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Figure 4: Effect of Restrictions on Access to Medical Care on Mortality Rates by Cause of Death
Notes: The Figure shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access health care on
cause-specific mortality rates. Restrictions are measured using the municipality × insurer × year
tutela rate. The estimates correspond to the instrumental variable specification discussed in Section
5.1. The standardized effect is calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation increase of the
tutela rate on the cause-specific mortality rate, divided by its standard deviation.
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Figure 5: Effect of Restrictions on Access to Medical Care on Mortality Rates by Age and Sex
(a) By Age
(b) By Sex
Notes: The Figure shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access to health care
on age-specific (Panel (a)) and sex-specific (Panel (b)) mortality rates. The model specification
uses complaint rates since the tutela data can not be disaggregated by age nor sex. The estimates
correspond to the instrumental variable specification discussed in Section 5.1. The standardized
effect is calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation increase of the complaint rate on the
age or sex-specific mortality rate, divided by its standard deviation.
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Table 1: Effect of Restrictions on Access to Medical Care on Mortality Rates: Three-Way Fixed
Effects IV Model
Dep. Var.: Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Enrollees)

















Tutela Rate 0.206 0.206 0.117 0.271
(0.041) (0.046) (0.014) (0.053)
Complaint Rate 0.179 0.090 0.100 0.093
(0.044) (0.029) (0.013) (0.037)
Observations 72,976 48,754 51,550 48,502 50,876 29,911 40,669 29,700
Summary Stats.
Av. Mortality Rate 3.83 3.82 3.90 3.81 4.10 4.06 4.10 4.06
( 3.37) ( 3.13) ( 3.10) ( 3.12) ( 3.36) ( 3.11) ( 3.06) ( 3.08)
Av. Tutela Rate 1.96 2.09 2.05 2.09
( 2.55) ( 2.63) ( 2.63) ( 2.63)
Av. Complaint Rate 3.93 4.13 3.91 4.13
( 4.01) ( 4.09) ( 4.02) ( 4.09)
Fixed Effecs
Municipality × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × Insurer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: lagged mortality,
Insurer Market share,
and ∆t Insurer Market Share No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
First Stage
F stat. First Stage 31.91 54.49 88.44 176.05
Standardized Effect 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.13 0.12
Notes: The Table shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access health care on mortality
rates. The IV estimates correspond to the three-way fixed effects IV model discussed in Section 5.1. Each
observation is weighted by the square root of the the number of enrollees in the insurer × municipality ×
year triad. All rates are defined per 1,000 enrollees. We report cluster-robust standard errors, clustered
by municipality. The standardized effect is calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation increase
of the tutela/complaint rate on the mortality rate, divided by its standard deviation.
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Table 2: Effect of Restrictions on Access to Medical Care on Mortality Rates by Regime:





















Tutela Rate 0.102 0.216 0.231 0.432
(0.015) (0.073) (0.033) (0.074)
Complaint Rate 0.107 0.075 0.074 0.326
(0.015) (0.038) (0.024) (0.126)
Observations 31,853 31,853 22,144 16,173 18,375 14,928 17,518 12,343
Fixed Effecs
Municipality × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurer × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × Insurer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: lagged mortality,
Insurer Market share,
and ∆t Insurer Market Share Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage
F stat. First Stage 46.66 199.87 11.89 10.57
Standardized Effect 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.41 0.08 0.38
Notes: The Table shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access health care on mortality
rates, conditional on regime. The IV estimates correspond to the three-way fixed effects IV model
discussed in Section 5.1. Each observation is weighted by the square root of the the number of enrollees
in the insurer × municipality × year triad. All rates are defined per 1,000 enrollees. We report cluster-
robust standard errors, clustered by municipality. The standardized effect is calculated as the effect
of a one standard deviation increase of the tutela/complaint rate on the mortality rate, divided by its
standard deviation. Summary statistics on the mortality, tutela and complaint rates are shown at the
bottom of Table 1.
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Table 3: Effect of Restrictions on Access to Medical Care on Mortality Rates: Shift-Share
Approach
Dep. Var.: Mortality Rate (per 1,000 Enrollees)

















Tutela Rate 0.228 0.297 0.095 0.181
(0.023) (0.105) (0.015) (0.059)
Complaint Rate 0.053 0.098 0.053 0.082
(0.011) (0.032) (0.013) (0.026)
Observations 7,721 7,721 6,574 6,574 5,510 5,510 5,499 5,499
Fixed Effecs
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: lagged utilization
and lagged mortality No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
First Stage
F stat. First Stage 10.93 48.02 15.38 20.77
Standardized Effect 0.31 0.38 0.14 0.26 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.18
Notes: The Table shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access health care
on mortality rates. The estimates in this table use municipality-year data that aggregates over
insurers. For this reason we replace the instrument in Tables 1 - 2 with the shift share IV discussed
in Section 5.2. All rates are defined per 1,000 enrollees. Each observation is weighted by the square
root of the the number of enrollees in the municipality × year. We report cluster-robust standard
errors, clustered by municipality. The standardized effect is calculated as the effect of a one
standard deviation increase of the tutela/complaint rate on the mortality rate, divided by its
standard deviation. Summary statistics on the mortality, tutela and complaint rates are shown
at the bottom of Table 1.
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Tutela Rate -4.19 -20.65 -12.26 -77.63
(0.95) (6.20) (3.15) (26.97)
Complaint Rate -4.32 -10.92 -16.07 -17.64
(0.53) (3.38) (2.57) (7.41)
Observations 6,570 6,570 5,460 5,460 6,574 6,574 5,493 5,493
Av. Dependent Variable 42.02 42.02 34.82 34.82 130.23 130.23 120.80 120.80
( 22.57) ( 22.57) ( 25.13) ( 25.13) ( 100.54) ( 100.54) ( 104.00) ( 104.00)
Fixed Effecs
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: lagged utilization
and lagged mortality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage
F stat. First Stage 48.02 20.77 48.02 20.80
Standardized Effect -0.11 -0.54 -0.25 -0.63 -0.07 -0.46 -0.23 -0.25
Notes: Table shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access health care on utilization of care
services. The estimates in this table use municipality-year data that aggregates over insurers. For this reason we
replace the instrument in Tables 1 - 2 with the shift share IV discussed in Section 5.2. All rates are defined per
1,000 enrollees. Each observation is weighted by the square root of the the number of enrollees in the municipality
× year pair. We report cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by municipality and year. The standardized effect
is calculated as the effect of a one standard deviation increase of the tutela/complaint rate on the utilization rate,
divided by its standard deviation. Summary statistics on the tutela and complaint rates are shown at the bottom
of Table 1.
33






















Tutela Rate -202.99 -1318.45 -138.26 -27.66
(42.53) (468.23) (44.76) (75.03)
Complaint Rate -215.81 -364.09 -57.26 -255.11
(24.66) (104.67) (24.72) (112.41)
Observations 6,574 6,574 5,499 5,499 6,573 6,573 5,493 5,493
Av. Dependent Variable 2326.44 2326.44 1984.81 1984.81 1770.12 1770.12 1572.65 1572.65
( 1095.44) ( 1095.44) ( 1173.62) ( 1173.62) ( 1127.84) ( 1127.84) ( 1161.11) ( 1161.11)
Fixed Effecs
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls: lagged utilization
and lagged mortality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First Stage
F stat. First Stage 48.02 20.77 47.91 20.80
Standardized Effect -0.11 -0.71 -0.27 -0.45 -0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.32
Notes: Table shows the estimated effect of supply side restrictions to access health care on utilization of care services.
The estimates in this table use municipality-year data that aggregates over insurers. For this reason we replace the
instrument in Tables 1 - 2 with the shift share IV discussed in Section 5.2. All rates are defined per 1,000 enrollees.
Each observation is weighted by the square root of the the number of enrollees in the municipality × year pair. We
report cluster-robust standard errors, clustered by municipality and year. The standardized effect is calculated as the
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For Online Publication
A Restrictions on Access to Health Care Services and Litigation:
A Simple Model
In this section we develop a simple decision model that captures the salient features of the
health care system in Colombia. The aim of the model is to make explicit the main factors
that determine the decision of insurers to restrict access to a service, and the decision of
enrollees to file tutelas or complaints. There are two periods. In the initial period agents
observe their health status, and, if required, get prescribed a treatment, procedure or medi-
cation. These prescriptions can be authorized or denied/delayed (henceforth restricted) by
the health insurer. Any medical service that is prescribed but not readily authorized is
enforceable through litigation, but not all individuals choose to use legal instruments.
Agents. There is a continuum of agents, each enrolled with a health insurer. Suppose
the initial endowment of health of an agent is given by the value of the variable h0 ∈ H =
{h10 . . . hH0 }, where larger values indicate better health. For each health endowment there
is a unique corresponding medical service, x ∈ X = {x1 . . . xH} that a health professional
prescribes, equal across agents.38 We assume h0, or alternatively x,
39 has a probability
distribution f that is common across agents. If a service x is prescribed and delivered, the
health level in the final period is hx ≥ h¬x, where h¬x is the health level of an agent that
was prescribed x but did not receive it.40 The assumption is that receiving medical care is
at least as good as not getting it.
If an insurer denies an authorization, an agent can use litigation to enforce its access.
To simplify, we assume tutelas are the only legal instrument available. An agent j that files
a tutela incurs an idiosyncratic cost ηj ∈ R+, expressed in health units, which is independent
of the service requested and the value of which is unobserved to the insurer. Filing a tutela
has no pecuniary cost, so we think of ηj as capturing effort (the effort required to learn about
the process) and psychic costs (the stress of filing the claim). We assume ηj has a known
cumulative distribution function G across the population. A tutela requesting a service x is
decided in favor of the plaintiff with an exogenous and known probability βx ∈ [0, 1]. This
probability can vary depending on the characteristics of the service requested, given that
some restrictions more clearly contravene an individual’s right to health. Finally, suppose
that agents only care about their health and wish to maximize a utility function U , where
U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.
If an agent j faces a restriction on a service x she will find it optimal to file a tutela if
βxU (hx − ηj) + (1− βx)U (h¬x − ηj) ≥ U (h¬x) , (A.1)
38Agents with the same health endowment get prescribed the same medical service.
39There is a one-to-one correspondence between H and X.




βx ≥ U (h
¬x)− U (h¬x − ηj)
U (hx − ηj)− U (h¬x − ηj)
. (A.2)
The inequality states that as long as ∆hx ≡ hx − h¬x > ηj, that is, if the health gain from
receiving the service is larger than the idiosyncratic health cost, there will be a value of βx
for which the agent finds it optimal to file a tutela.
The ratio on the right hand side of inequality A.2 is an increasing function of ηj, which
takes a minimum value of zero at ηj = 0. This implies that for a given β
x > 0, there is a
lower threshold of the idiosyncratic cost, ηx, such that all agents that get x restricted and
have ηj ≤ ηx will file a tutela. Hence, from the point of view of the insurer, the probability
that an agent will file a tutela if x is restricted is αx ≡ G(ηx). Note ηx is determined by two
exogenous factors in the model: i). how much improvement in health an agent gets from
receiving the service (∆hx); and ii). the probability that litigation for x is decided in favor
of the plaintiff (βx).
Health Insurers. Insurers, indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., I}, receive a capitation payment y for
each enrollee, which is exogenously determined. If an insurer authorizes a requested service
x, it pays the full cost cxi . The costs of service provision can vary across insurers reflecting the
fact that they can contract with their own independent network of providers. If they restrict
a service, and the affected agent files a tutela that is upheld, the insurer pays the full cost
of the service plus an additional idiosyncratic cost c̃i ∈ R+. We think of this idiosyncratic
cost as capturing factors like the administrative costs of dealing with the claims and general
managerial efficiency. There are no additional penalties reflecting the fact that each case is
treated individually and generates no precedent.
An insurer receiving a request to authorize a service x finds it optimal to restrict access
if






This implies that every authorization for services for which this inequality holds will be
restricted by insurer i, regardless of who makes the request. That is, some treatments,
procedures or medications will always face supply side barriers to access. Let’s define the
subset of restricted services by insurer i as Xri ⊆ X. Which services belong to Xri depends
on three factors: i). the cost of providing the service (cxi ); ii). the probability that, if x is
restricted, an agent will file a claim that is upheld (αxβx); and iii). the idiosyncratic cost c̃i.
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Restrictions and Tutela Rates. We can now characterize some of the aggregate quanti-
ties used in the empirical strategy. First, since every service x ∈ Xri is restricted by insurer
i, the fraction of its enrollees that face restrictions is equal to the fraction of enrollees that





Equation A.5 shows that, beyond the three factors that determine Xri , the restriction rate
also depends on the demand for medical care, as defined by the probability distribution of
services requested f .













∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of enrollees in insurer i that file tutelas condi-
tional on having their requested services restricted. It follows that
Tutelai = αiRestrictioni. (A.7)
Equation A.7 allows us to use the tutela rate to proxy the restriction rate which is not
observed. In terms of the decision tree of Figure 3, αi corresponds to the ratio of enrollees
that end up in nodes C or D, relative to the total number of enrollees in nodes B,C, or D.
Holding the demand for medical care constant, a larger restriction rate will translate into
worse average health outcomes in the final period. We assumed receiving medical care was
at least as good as not getting it (∆hx ≥ 0), so restrictions can only lead to a deterioration
of population health. It follows from Equation A.7 that an increase in the restriction rate
that is not demand driven will be reflected in a higher tutela rate and associated with i).
lower utilization of health care services and ii). a higher mortality rate. These are the two
key empirical predictions of the model. The predicted associations will be attenuated by the





of services are delivered after favorable judicial rulings. But the fact that some services are
nevertheless restricted implies there is an unmet demand for health care, defined as the share
of services that are requested but not delivered. More formally,
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∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of enrollees that receive medical care as a







Figure B.1: Coverage of the Health System: Overall and by Regime
Notes: The bars show the share of the the population that is either in the contributory or subsidized regimes
by year. The two lines report the share of population that is in the subsidized regime (solid) and contributory
regime (dashed) by year.
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Figure B.2: Competitive Structure of the Health Care System
(a) Insurers per Municipality
Share of Municipalities with at Most One, Two or Three Insurers
(b) Subsidized Regime (c) contributory Regime
Notes: Panel (a) shows the average number of insurers per municipality and by regime. Panels (b) and (c)
show the share (× 100) of municipalities that have at most 1, 2, or 3 insurers by regime.
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Figure B.3: Examples of Press Coverage Documenting Insurers Limiting Access to Care Services
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Figure B.4: Evolution of Tutelas Invoking the Right-to-Health by Defendant Body, Share of Services
Requested Included in the Benefit Package, First Instance Decision by the Judge, and Regime
(a) Share of Health Related Tutelas by Defendant
Body
(b) Share of Services Demanded in Tutelas that are
Included in the Benefit Package
(c) Share of Health Related Tutelas Decided in Favor
of the Claimant
(d) Share of Health Related Tutelas by Regime
Source: Authors calculation based on Defensoŕıa del Pueblo (2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015).
The numbers reported in Panels (c) and (d) include tutelas made against other actors in the system different
from insurers (i.e. IPSs, Secretary of Health and Social Protection, local authorities).
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Figure B.5: Type of Treatment Requested and Diagnoses Associated with the Tutelas Invoking the
Right-to-Health
(a) Type of Treatment Requested in Tutelas Invoking the Right-to-Health
(b) Diagnoses Associated with the Tutelas in 2015
Source for Panel (a): authors calculation based on Defensoŕıa del Pueblo (2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2015). Source for Panel (b): Ministerio de Salud y Proteccion Social (2018). The numbers reported
in both panels include tutelas made against other actors in the system different from insurers (i.e. IPSs,
Secretary of Health and Social Protection, local authorities).
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Figure B.6: Complaint and Mortality Rates by Age and Sex Conditional on Regime
(a) By Age
(b) By Sex
Notes: Panel (a) reports the average complaint and mortality rates by age. Panel (b) reports the
average complaint and mortality rates by sex. The divisions correspond to the people affected by
the complaint, not those that file it
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Number Share Number Share Number Share
Restriction of Access to Care Services* 737,785.0 44.1 565,273.0 47.7 119,172.0 32.1
Delays of Authorizations** 305,508.0 18.3 185,351.0 15.6 101,967.0 27.5
Problems with Affiliation 144,362.0 8.6 97,255.0 8.2 41,462.0 11.2
Restriction to Change/Choose Insurer/Provider 84,311.0 5.0 46,828.0 4.0 35,716.0 9.6
Denials of Authorizations** 75,309.0 4.5 51,778.0 4.4 18,445.0 5.0
Notes: The numbers in the overall column include complaints made against other actors in the system different
from insurers (i.e. IPSs, Secretary of Health and Social Protection, local authorities). The numbers by regime
include only complaints made against insurers. *Includes lack of opportunity to get an appointment with a
care specialist, lack of opportunity to program a surgery, lack of opportunity to program an exam, and lack of
opportunity to get a medication amongst others. **Includes authorizations for appointments with care specialists,
surgeries, exams, and medications.
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